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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PATRICIA J. SMUIN, : 
Plaintiff, Appellee, : 
and Cross-Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 900483-CA 
FLOYD R. SMUIN, : 
Defendant, Appellant, : 
and Cross-Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under 78-2A-3(2)(g), Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is taken from a final judgment entered by 
the Honorable Judge Dennis L. Draney, Eighth Judicial District 
Court, relative to a divorce proceeding. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review in this 
appeal: 
1. Did the Court err in computing alimony? 
2. Did the Court abuse its discretion in awarding 
$400.00 a month permanent alimony considering the actual 
length of the marriage, the indebtedness of the parties, which 
indebtedness was caused by Plaintiff, and considering the 
contribution to the marriage made by Plaintiff? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Interpretation of Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Proceedings Below 
On November 24, 1989, Plaintiff-Appellee filed a 
Complaint for Divorce claiming irreconcilable differences 
between the parties. The Complaint sought a Decree ordering 
Defendant-Appellant to pay all the debts of the marriage, that 
Defendant should provide medical and dental health insurance 
as provided by his employer for Plaintiff, under COBRA, that 
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Plaintiff-Appellee should be awarded one-half of 
Defendant-Appellant's retirement and profit-sharing plan, and 
that Defendant should be ordered to pay alimony to Plaintiff 
in the sum of $300.00 per month through March, 1990, or until 
the month in which the Plaintiff-Appellee receives Social 
Security benefits, whichever occurs first, and thereafter the 
sum of $150.00 a month in alimony to the Plaintiff (R.l). 
In defense of the foregoing claims, 
Defendant-Appellant claims the fact that the parties only 
lived together for approximately five years during the course 
of their marriage and, therefore, the Court should take this 
fact into consideration upon the award of property and alimony 
(R.9). Defendant-Appellant further shows the Court that much 
money had been spent to satisfy the desires of 
Plaintiff-Appellee, and indeed were still being spent in 
repaying the debts incurred by Plaintiff-Appellee (Tr. 83, 
L.6, et seq.; Tr. 84 L. 1-15). 
The case was set for a bench trial before the 
Honorable Dennis Draney. 
Following a hearing, the Court granted 
Plaintiff-Appellee a divorce, insurance as provided for by 
COBRA, the bills of the marriage which were approximately 
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$36,000.00, being secured by a mortgage on 
Defendant-Appellant's home, which home# had been owned by 
Defendant free and clear of any indebtedness prior to the 
marriage of the parties herein, $400.00 a month alimony 
payable by Defendant to Plaintiff-Appellee, and 
Defendant-Appellant awarded whatever interest he might have in 
and to his profit-sharing plan and retirement held by his 
employer, and lastly, the Plaintiff was awarded the 1975 Buick 
free and clear and the Defendant-Appellant was awarded the 
1973 trailer free and clear and the 1987 Cadillac, together 
with the indebtedness of $12,000,00 thereon (R.48)• 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were married in August of 1976. Three or 
four years prior to that time, the Defendant's wife died of 
cancer. Plaintiff divorced her first husband in June of 
1970. Plaintiff had four children, one of which was living 
with her; the Defendant had three children living in his home 
(Tr. 86, 87) . 
In August of 1976, Defendant's home was appraised at 
approximately $44,000.00 (Tr. 77 L. 16-19). Plaintiff 
testified that she brought to the marriage two deep freezers, 
a washer-dryer, stove, refrigerator, bedroom furniture, living 
room furniture, a nice dining room set and buffet (Tr. 20 L. 
20); however, she further testified that when she originally 
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left the Defendant in 1981, she took with her the furniture as 
stated above, but left the appliances with the Defendant (Tr. 
22 L. 12). Defendant stated that Plaintiff wished to sell the 
appliances to him and that he paid either $1,000.00 or 
$1,100.00 for the said appliances (Tr. 79 L. 19); however, he 
stated that one of the deep freezers that he now had was hers 
(Tr. 80 L. 1). 
Apparently, the only tangible things that Plaintiff 
brought to the marriage was an automobile, which automobile 
she later traded for the automobile she now has, a part of 
which automobile was paid for by Defendant. Plaintiff further 
states that she bought drapes and new curtains "for most of 
the rooms". She also "got storm doors", but did not testify 
that she paid for those. She further testified that she 
bought paint and painted the eaves and inside of the house 
where it needed it (Tr. 25 L. 12). 
She testified that after she had left the Defendant in 
1981, the Defendant took her on their vacations each year and 
that she enjoyed it (Tr. 29 L. 10), and that the Defendant 
took her out to dinner at night very often (Tr. 90 L. 1). She 
further testified that "a few times" the Defendant spent the 
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night at her place during those seven years (Tr. 28 L. 24-25); 
Defendant testified on cross-examination that he had "very 
little if I did" in response to the question, "Isn't it 
correct that you also had marital relations during this time 
period (seven years)?" (Tr. 90 L. 2-10). During this time, 
Defendant did not file against Plaintiff for a divorce as he 
"kept thinking maybe things would work out", (Tr. 89 L. 18). 
After seven years, Plaintiff sold the trailer that she and her 
son had been living in; however, the money was not used in the 
marriage (Tr. 80 L. 15-24). 
A couple of years after Plaintiff had left Defendant, 
she and one of her sons approached the Defendant to finance a 
business venture which Plaintiff would be managing, which 
business was the retail sale of children's clothing, an area 
which Plaintiff stated that she had expertise, as she stated 
it, "the clothing retail business is something I know very, 
very well" (Tr. 35 L. 2-9). Thinking that perhaps because of 
her expertise in this field (evidenced only by her say-so), 
that a viable business could be put together and that maybe 
this would be the catalyst to make their marriage work out, 
Defendant went along with the idea and borrowed approximately 
$47,000 to set up the business, for which Defendant pledged 
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and mortgaged his home as collateral (R. 26 Defs #4)• For a 
while, the business went well, but then the Plaintiff 
apparently lost interest in it and hired her daughter-in-law 
to manage and staff the store. In a relatively short time, 
less than a year, the store foundered (Tr. 83 L. 17 et seq). 
Defendant has been making regular payments on that note since 
the inception of the loan in 1983 (Tr. 84 L. 8-12), and 
currently looks forward to another ten years of payments. 
Plaintiff inherited approximately $19,000.00 during 
the course of the marriage, which $19,000.00 was used partly 
to pay off her mothers bills and the rest she spent on 
herself, but none of the money was used in the marriage (Tr. 
79 L. 3-11) . The writer is not able to ascertain the sum of 
the annuity or retirement benefits due or to be due from 
Defendant's employer upon Defendant's retirement, nor which 
portion was earned by Defendant prior to the marriage of the 
parties; the Findings of Fact entered herein were of no help 
in this matter (R. 41). The Court below decreed that all of 
Defendant's retirement and pension funds were solely his 
property; however, the Court further decreed that the 
outstanding mortgage balance on Defendant's home in the sum of 
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approximately $36,000.00 remaining, should be paid 100 per 
cent by him (R. 48)• The Court further decreed that he should 
pay approximately $130.00 a month (Tr. 99 L. 3-11) for the 
extended benefits of Defendant's health insurance coverage 
through his employment covering his wife under COBRA 
provisions (R. 48) . Defendant, without any Motion To Amend 
Pleadings under Rule 15(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, was 
further ordered to pay monthly to Plaintiff the sum of $400.00 
a month as alimony; no definite period was set for this 
alimony (R.48). The Court found that during the course of the 
marriage, Plaintiff was disabled (R. 43), and the disability 
has been adjudged permanent by Social Security Administration 
(R.27, L. 11). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The subject case should be remanded to have the Trial 
Court make findings as to the value of Defendant's retirement 
so that a proper determination can be made as to the amount of 
money represented by one-half of the retirement earned during 
the time that the parties lived together as man and wife prior 
to their separation or at least during the course of the legal 
marriage. 
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The payment of the debt secured by a mortgage on 
Defendant's home for the purchase of Plaintiff's business, 
which debt has a present balance of approximately $36,000,00, 
should be deducted from the value of Plaintiff's share of 
Defendant's retirement, as the home was brought to the 
marriage by Defendant free and clear of any encumbrance, and 
should be restored to Defendant, Woodward v. Woodward, 656 
P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), Anderson v. Anderson, 757 P.2d 476 (Utah 
1988) • 
The payment of $130.00 per month for eighteen months 
for Plaintiff's insurance should be considered alimony. 
Upon retirement, Defendant's salary shall cease and 
alimony should stop. 
Plaintiff should be awarded as alimony the sum of 
$170.00 per month until the group policy of health insurance 
obtainable by Plaintiff through Defendant's employment 
pursuant to COBRA provisions, expires and $300.00 per month 
thereafter as asked for in Plaintiff's Complaint for a 
reasonable time, but not to exceed Defendant's date of 
retirement, at which time alimony should cease. This gives 
Plaintiff alimony in exchange for five and a half years of 
living together as husband and wife, plus seven years as 
separated but still legally married. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
THE COURT ERRED IN THE COMPUTATION OF ALIMONY. 
There is no question as to the Court's discretionary 
powers to award alimony as done in the subject case; the need 
for financial assistance for Plaintiff is clear, the 
Plaintiff's inability to provide for herself has been 
evidenced by Social Security Administration, (although no 
evidence has been adduced showing her inability to return to 
being a dispatcher), and lastly the Defendant's present 
ability to pay, (Emphasis Supplied). 
However, it is respectfully submitted that justice 
would be better served if the Court had taken into 
consideration the facts of Plaintiff's total lack of positive 
contribution to the marriage and Plaintiff's probable 
development of her incapacity prior to her marriage to 
Defendant, 
It would seem reasonable that a "childhood (which) was 
remarkable for physical and sexual abuse", (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 14, Paragraph 2), would surely have a depressing 
effect upon an adult's psyche. 
Plaintiff was a divorced woman, (Tr. 17 L. 7-10), with 
four children to raise - a situation which seems to be 
-10-
universally considered by psychiatrists most traumatic and a 
sure source of depression and anxiety. 
Of course, Plaintiff claims in Court that she was 
emotionally in good health at the time of marriage to 
Defendant; however, this is not what she told Dr. Mooney, 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 14). 
Mr. David Emmett, licensed "clinical social worker", 
(Tr. 4 L. 19-20), reports "I do know she has drank (sic) from 
time to time in her life, and that's what we commonly call 
alcohol abuse", (Tr. 13 L. 3). Plaintiff admits that she, at 
one time, was drinking a bottle of wine a day and that "that 
was alcohol abuse", (Tr. 41 L. 22-24). 
There is no question that Plaintiff had much stress in 
her life, e.q. son, Michael had cancer; son Michael's wife 
left him and took his deaf child with her; Plaintiff's mother 
became very ill and died, not to mention the physical and 
sexual abuse as a child and the previous divorce. However, 
none of this was a result of Plaintiff's marriage to Defendant. 
The record shows that, although Defendant apparently 
was not a demonstrative man, he did his best for the 
Plaintiff. She says that he left her after her aneurysm, 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 14, Para. 4 L. 2-3). Not so. She had 
her aneurysm surgery in 1988, (Tr. 44 L. 2-5). The facts are 
that she left the Defendant in October, 1981, (Tr. 26 L. 20), 
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and after her aneurysm in 1988, Defendant took her back to his 
home. All during the time that they were separated, Defendant 
continued to help Plaintiff - visiting her, taking her on 
trips, spending money on her, continuing her as beneficiary 
upon his death - "I kept thinking maybe things would work 
out. But it sure wouldn't", (Tr. 89 L. 18-19), "The only 
time she really wanted to have anything to do with me is if it 
was spending money", (Tr. 89 L. 12). 
Plaintiff tried all through the Hearing to make 
Defendant out to be a bad person, e.q. she inferred that, when 
she left Defendant the first time in 1981, she left all her 
appliances with Defendant, gratis, (Tr. 23 L. 11). But 
Defendant testified that he paid her "$1,000.00 or $1,100.00" 
for the appliances, except for one freezer, (Tr. 79 L. 
20-22). On rebuttal, Plaintiff said nothing about this. 
Plaintiff further testified that Defendant 
intentionally hit her head against the truck window, (Tr. 69 
L. 17-19). Defendant flatly denies this, (Tr. 78 L. 2-9). 
When Plaintiff wanted to open her own business (she 
apparently told Dr. Mooney that she was the "owner of a 
children's clothing store", Plaintiff's Exhibit 14, Para. 3, 
L. 6), she, her son and her daughter-in-law approached 
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Defendant to finance the endeavor (Tr. 35 L. 2-5). Plaintiff 
tried to convince the Court that even though Hit was something 
that we had always wanted to do but never" — "it was Floyd 
that jumped into it". (Tr. 35 L. 7-13). However, when asked 
"what was Mr. Smuin's role in the business?", she answered, 
"Well, he financed it." (Tr. 35 L. 19-20). She managed the 
business, made all decisions and "made some mistakes". (Tr. 37 
L. 12-21). In order to finance the business, Defendant 
borrowed approximately $47,000 from the bank, using as 
collateral his home, which asset he had brought to the 
marriage free and clear of encumbrances, (Tr. 77 L. 14) which 
loan carries a balance today of $36,000. 
The Plaintiff received lump sums during the marriage 
($3,000 from sale of trailer, Tr. 80 L. 15-18; $19,000 
inheritance from Mother, Tr. 79 L. 1-12, $5,000 lump sum from 
Social Security Tr. 60 L. 18-19); none of such sums were used 
in the marriage. 
II 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING A FIXED SUM OF ALIMONY FOR 
AN INDETERMINATE PERIOD. 
The Court was led to believe that the $427.00 social 
security per month was Plaintiff's only source of money 
forever. Medicaid and Medicare will, of course, come into 
play when needed; $130.00 per month paid by Defendant for 
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Plaintiff's health insurance certainly counts. There is also, 
this writer has been led to believe, at the age of 62 years, a 
provision in Social Security Regulations that a divorced woman 
may apply for an amount equal to one-half of that to which her 
ex-husband would be entitled - (This does not diminish the 
amount paid to the ex-husband). Although poorly written, 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 11 states at Paragraph 4 that $427.00 per 
month is the only social security that Plaintiff can draw at 
this time; if she should "qualify for another kind of social 
security benefit in the future...""she will have to file 
another application." (Emphasis Supplied). 
There will, of course, be far less net after taxes 
available to Defendant because of the change in filing 
individually rather than as married. 
CONCLUSION 
The subject case should be remanded for proper 
Findings of Fact showing the value of Defendant's retirement 
plus a comprehensive computation as to the value of 
Plaintiff's share of Defendant's retirement. Following this 
result, alimony should be computed as to an amount minus the 
$130.00 insurance payment per month now being made by 
-14-
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[%\ The parties m this case had two 
minor children at the time of the divorce. 
Plaintiff had an earning power of $6,000 
and defendant had an earning power of 
$39,000 per year. The parties' stipulation 
provided that plaintiff would receive $500 
per month child support for two minor chil-
dren and no alimony. In addition, the stip-
ulation awarded plaintiff the parties' home 
until the youngest child, who was born in 
1971, reached the age of eighteen, at which 
time it would revert to defendant. The 
court declined to enter a decree in conform-
ity with the stipulation, finding it ineq-
uitable, and instead awarded plaintiff $400 
per month alimony and a one-half interest 
in the home, with the right to live in it at 
no cost for so long as she wished. Based 
on these facts and the testimony contained 
in the record, we find no abuse of discre-
tion in the court's rejection of the settle-
ment agreement as being inequitable, or in 
the terms incorporated into the final find-
ings of fact, conclusions of law and decree 
of divorce. 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
BILLINGS and DAVIDSON, JJ., 
concur. 
( O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
Gay ANDERSEN, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Glade C. ANDERSEN, Defendant 
and Respondent 
No. 870338-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 22, 1988. 
On appeal from judgment of the First 
District Court, Cache County, Omer J. Call, 
J., in divorce proceeding, the Court of Ap-
peals, Greenwood, J., held that: (1) award 
to former wife of $3Q0 per mouth in alimo-
ny was appropriate, but alimony should not 
have been ordered terminated upon former 
wife's completion of education or full-time 
employment; (2) award of parties' home to 
former wife until April 1, 1989, at which 
time it was to be sold and proceeds to be 
divided equally, did not represent misappli-
cation of law, was supported by evidence, 
and was not clearly inequitable; (3) remand 
was warranted for determination of how 
money in IRA account, one half of which 
had been awarded to former wife, was 
spent by former husband; and (4) former 
wife should have been awarded attorney 
fees. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and 
remanded. 
L Divorce <fc»237 
In awarding alimony, trial court must 
consider financial conditions and need of 
spouse seeking alimony, ability of spouse 
seeking alimony to produce sufficient in-
come, and ability of paying spouse to pro-
vide support. 
2. Divorce <3=>150.2, 184(12) 
Trial court in divorce action must make 
findings on all material issues, and its fail-
ure to do so constitutes reversible error 
unless findings in record are clear, uncon-
troverted, and capable of supporting only 
finding in favor of judgment. 
3. Divorce <3=»240(2) 
Award of $300 per month in alimony 
was not abuse of discretion, given parties' 
limited resources; trial court found that 
obligor spouse would have only $843 per 
wvoftth from which to pay &ttmo*vy wvd h\& 
own living expenses. 
4. Divorce <3=>247 
Order that monthly alimony terminate 
when recipient spouse completed her edu-
cation or became employed full time was 
abuse of discretion, where recipient spouse 
was in her 50's, had spent most her life 
providing services to her family with no 
remuneration, and had minimal work expe-
rience; proof should have been required 
ANDERSEN v. ANDERSEN Utah 477 
Cite as 757 V2d 476 (Utah App. 1988) 
that recipient spouse's financial circum- Richard B. Johnson (argued), Orem, for 
stances had materially changed. defendant and respondent. 
5. Divorce <3=>252.5(1) 
Award of parties' home to former wife 
until April 1, 1989, at which time it was to 
be sold and proceeds divided equally, did 
not represent misapplication of law, was 
supported by evidence, and was not clearly 
inequitable. 
6. Divorce «=»253(4) 
In order to permit appellate review of 
trial court's property distribution in divorce 
proceeding, distribution should be based 
upon written findings placing dollar value 
on assets distributed. 
7. Divorce <3»253(3) 
Although assets are generally valued 
at time of divorce decree, trial court may 
value property at an earlier date where one 
party has dissipated an asset, hidden its 
value, or otherwise acted obstructively. 
8. Divorce <3=*287 
Remand of award of one half of par-
ties' IRA to former wife was warranted 
where district court made no finding as to 
whether IRA was valued as of time of 
divorce decree or earlier date, former hus-
band had liquidated account and spent all 
but $3,300 of it at time of trial, and record 
did not indicate fully the use of balance of 
fund proceedings. 
9. Divorce <s=»227(l) 
Award of attorney fees in divorce pro-
ceedings must be based on evidence of both 
financial need of party and reasonableness 
of fee award. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-3. 
10. Divorce <S=>227(1) 
Former wife should have been award-
ed attorney fees of $1,800 in divorce pro-
ceedings, in light of her financial need and 
reasonableness of these fees; former wife 
had earned $200 per month or less while 
former husband's net monthly income was 
$1,405. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-3. 
Larry E. Jones (argued), Hillyard, 
Anderson & Olsen, Logan, for plaintiff and 
appellant. 
Before GREENWOOD, DAVIDSON 
and BILLINGS, JJ. 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Plaintiff, Gay Andersen, appeals the trial 
court's alimony award, its failure to specify 
the dollar value of the parties' IRA ac-
count, and its failure to award plaintiff her 
attorney fees. We affirm in part, reverse 
in part and remand. 
The parties were divorced in July 1987 
after almost thirty-four years of marriage. 
During the marriage, the parties had four 
children. Defendant, Glade C. Andersen, 
was employed as a truck driver during 
most of the marriage and earned $26,000 
annual gross income at the time of trial. 
Plaintiff was a housewife during the mar-
riage, and her only employment outside the 
home was as an on-call school lunch cook. 
In 1987, plaintiff earned $290, and in 1986, 
$1,153.40. Plaintiff testified at trial that 
she had no work skills but would like to 
enroll in business school to acquire clerical 
skills. She also testified that her monthly 
expenses were between $875.45 and 
$915.45 per month. Defendant testified 
that his monthly expenses were over $1,800 
per month. The parties' home, which was 
paid for, was appraised at $46,000. At the 
time of the parties' separation in August 
1986, their IRA account contained 
$8,340.76. Defendant liquidated the IRA 
account in the fall of 1986 but had spent all 
but $3,300 of those funds at the time of 
trial. 
The trial court found that defendant's 
current gross income was $26,000 per year 
with a net monthly income of $1,405 and 
that defendant had debt payments due of 
$465 and $97.82 per month. The court 
found that plaintiff was in good health, had 
earned $200 per month or less and had 
begun training for other employment. The 
court valued the parties' home at $46,000 
and noted that there was insufficient in-
come to meet both parties' living expenses 
and debt obligations. Plaintiff was award-
757 P.2d-12 
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ed use of the parties' home until April 1, 
1989, at which time the home was to be 
sold and the net proceeds divided equally. 
Both parties were awarded one-half of the 
value of the IRA account, but the court did 
not place a value on the account. The 
court awarded plaintiff $300 per month ali-
mony until she completed her schooling or 
became employed full-time. The court 
found that defendant would have only $843 
per month from which to pay the $300 per 
month alimony and his own living ex-
penses, while plaintiff would have $300 per 
month alimony and $200 per month earn-
ings and no rent payments. 
ALIMONY 
[1,2] Plaintiff contends that the trial 
court erred in awarding her only $300 per 
month alimony and in ordering termination 
of alimony upon her completion of edu-
cation or full-time employment. In divorce 
proceedings, the trial court has considera-
ble discretion in adjusting the parties' fi-
nancial interests. Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 
1378, 1380 (Utah Ct.App.1987). We will 
not disturb the trial court's decision unless 
it is clearly unjust or an abuse of discre-
tion. Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 
1078 (Utah 1988). "[T]he most important 
function of alimony is to provide support 
for the wife as nearly as possible at the 
standard of living she enjoyed during mar-
riage, and to prevent the wife from becom-
ing a public charge." Jones v. Jones, 700 
P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985) (quoting Eng-
lish v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 
1977)). In awarding alimony, the trial 
court must consider three factors: 1) the 
financial conditions and need of the spouse 
seeking alimony; 2) the ability of the 
spouse seeking alimony to produce suffi-
cient income; and 3) the ability of the pay-
ing spouse to provide support. Id.; Smith 
v. Smith, 751 P.2d 1149, 1152 (Utah Ct. 
App.1988). The trial court must make find-
ings on all material issues, and its failure 
to do so constitutes reversible error unless 
the facts in the record are clear, uncontro-
verted, and capable of supporting only a 
finding in favor of the judgment. Gard-
ner, 748 P.2d at 1078. 
[3] In this case, the court found that 
plaintiff was in good health, had earned 
$200 per month or less and was training 
for other employment. The record indi-
cates that plaintiffs financial needs were 
$875.45 to $915.45 monthly while defend-
ant's needs were $1,800 per month. The 
court found that defendant's net monthly 
income was $1,405 and that defendant had 
payments on various loans and accounts 
totaling $465 per month and a credit union 
payment of $97.82 monthly. The court 
then found that after those payments de-
fendant had only $843 per month to pay his 
own expenses and the $300 per month ali-
mony. Accordingly, the court considered 
all of the factors set forth in Jones. We 
find that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in awarding plaintiff $300 per 
month alimony, given the limited resources 
of the parties. 
[4] However, we agree with plaintiff 
that the court abused its discretion in ter-
minating her alimony when she completes 
her schooling or becomes employed full-
time. In Jones, the Utah Supreme Court 
found that an alimony award which de-
creased over the years was inequitable. 
Specifically, the Court stated: "The wife is 
in her mid-50's, possesses few marketable 
job skills, and has little hope of retraining. 
This is simply not the sort of situation in 
which a decreasing rehabilitative alimony 
award is appropriate." Jones, 700 P.2d at 
1076. Subsequently, in Olson v. Olson, 
704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985), the Court found 
that the trial court's order that alimony 
terminate after two years was a clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion where the 
wife had minimal experience and no reason-
able expectation of obtaining employment 
at the standard of living she enjoyed dur-
ing the marriage. 
As in Jones and Olson, plaintiff is in her 
50's, has spent most of her life providing 
services to her famiiy with no remunera-
tion, and has minimal work experience. 
Given that lack of work experience, she 
cannot be expected to immediately find a 
job upon completion of her schooling. 
Also, her salary when she does find em-
ployment is unknown. The speculative na-
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ture of her future was corroborated during 
appellate argument when counsel repre-
sented that plaintiff had completed school, 
her alimony had terminated and she had 
not found employment. Under the facts in 
this case, the court's order terminating 
plaintiffs alimony upon completion of her 
schooling without requiring proof that her 
financial circumstances had materially 
changed is an abuse of discretion and 
places an unwarranted burden on plaintiff. 
Because this court can modify the final 
decree in a divorce action, Olson, 704 P.2d 
at 567, we hereby modify the decree of 
divorce to provide that the $300 per month 
alimony is awarded and terminates as pro-
vided for by law. If there is a material 
change of circumstances warranting modi-
fication, appropriate proceedings may be 
initiated to modify the decree at that time. 
PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION 
The next issue is whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in awarding plaintiff 
the parties' home until April 1, 1989, at 
which time it is to be sold and the proceeds 
divided equally. Trial courts in divorce 
proceedings are given considerable discre-
tion in adjusting the parties' financial and 
property interests. Burnham v. Burn-
ham, 716 P.2d 781, 782 (Utah 1986). The 
trial court's actions are presumed valid, 
and, to overcome that presumption, the ap-
pealing party must demonstrate a that 
there was "a misunderstanding or misappli-
cation of the law resulting in substantial 
and prejudicial error, or that the evidence 
clearly preponderated against the findings, 
or that such a serious inequity has resulted 
from the order as to constitute an abuse of 
the trial court's discretion." Colman v. 
Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 789 (Utah CtApp. 
1987) (quoting McCrary v. McCrary, 599 
P.2d 1248, 1250 (Utah 1979). 
[5] In this case, the court awarded 
plaintiff the parties' home until April 1, 
1989. After that date, the court ordered 
the house sold and the proceeds divided 
equally. Plaintiff has not demonstrated 
that by entering the above order the court 
misapplied the law or that the evidence 
preponderated against the order. Also, our 
review of the record does not convince us 
that the court's order is clearly inequitable. 
Therefore, we hold that the court did not 
abuse its discretion in its order regarding 
the parties' home. 
FINDINGS 
[6] We next determine whether the trial 
court abused its discretion in awarding 
plaintiff one-half of the parties' IRA with-
out making a finding as to the value of the 
IRA. In order to permit appellate review 
of a trial court's property distribution in a 
divorce proceeding, the distribution should 
be based upon written findings. Jones, 700 
P.2d at 1074. The findings must place a 
dollar value on the assets distributed. Id.; 
Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah 
Ct.App.1987). Failure to make findings on 
all material issues is reversible error unless 
the facts in the record are clear, uncontro-
verted and capable of supporting only a 
finding in favor of the judgment. Gard-
ner, 748 P.2d at 1078. 
In this case, the court awarded plaintiff 
one-half of the IRA account without plac-
ing a value on the account. The record 
indicates that in July 1986, the account 
contained $8,340.76. On September 26, 
1986, after the parties had separated, de-
fendant cashed the IRA, taking $4,127.95 
and transferring $4,000 to another bank 
certificate. In October 1986, defendant 
cashed the $4,000 certificate. At trial, de-
fendant testified that $3,300 of the IRA 
funds were left, but did not explain disposi-
tion of the remainder of the funds. With-
out placing a value on the IRA account, the 
court awarded plaintiff one-half of the ac-
count to each party. 
[7,8] Although assets are generally 
valued at the time of the divorce decree, 
the trial court may value the property at an 
earlier date where one party has dissipated 
an asset, hidden its value or otherwise act-
ed obstructively. Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 
1050, 1052 (Utah CtApp 1987). In this 
case, the findings do not state whether the 
asset is valued as of the time of the divorce 
decree or at an earlier date. Further, the 
record does not indicate fully the use of the 
balance of the IRA fund proceeds by de-
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fendant. Therefore, we remand to the trial 
court for a determination of how the money 
was spent. Amounts expended for the par-
ties' joint expenses should be deducted 
from the original $8,340.76 IRA account, 
and each party should be awarded half of 
that balance. Expenditures for defend-
ant's individual expenses should not, how-
ever, be deducted prior to the division. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
[9] Finally, we consider whether the tri-
al court abused its discretion in failing to 
award plaintiff attorney fees. Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-3-3 (1984) provides that a trial 
court may award attorney fees in divorce 
proceedings. The award must be based on 
evidence of both financial need of the party 
and the reasonableness of the fee awarded. 
Walther v. Walther, 709 P.2d 387, 388 
(Utah 1985). The decision to deny or 
award attorney fees lies primarily within 
the trial court's discretion. Id.; Rasband 
v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1336 (Utah Ct. 
App.1988). 
[10] In this case, plaintiffs income and 
earning ability paled in comparison to those 
of defendant. The court found that plain-
tiff had earned $200 per month or less in 
the school lunch program while defendant's 
net monthly income was $1,405. Further, 
plaintiff testified that she had no means 
with which to pay her fees. At trial, the 
parties stipulated that plaintiffs attorney 
fees of $1,800 were reasonable. Given the 
great disparity in earnings, we find that 
the trial court abused its discretion in fail-
ing to award plaintiff attorney fees in light 
of her financial need and the reasonable-
ness of the fees. Accordingly, plaintiff is 
awarded her attorney fees at trial and on 
appeal. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and 
remanded for further findings and entry of 
judgment. Other issues raised in this ap-
peal are without merit. 
DAVIDSON and BILLINGS, JJ., 
concur. 
(o § KEV NUMBER SYSTIM> 
ADELE'S HOUSEKEEPING, 
INC., Plaintiff, 
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY, Defendant 
No. 870445-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 28, 1988. 
The Board of Review of the Industrial 
Commission determined that an employ-
ment relationship existed between provider 
of housekeeping services and the house-
keepers it solicited and that provider was 
therefore liable for employer contributions 
for unemployment compensation. Provider 
petitioned for review. The Court of Ap-
peals, Bench, J., held that no employment 
relationship existed where plaintiff adver-
tised for both housekeepers and home-
owners, referred the housekeepers to 
homeowners who personally informed the 
housekeeper of services requested, and 
was paid its referral commission either by 
the homeowners or housekeepers. 
Reversed. 
1. Administrative Law and Procedure 
e=>788 
Social Security and Public Welfare 
<3=>652 
Court defers to Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission in interpretation and 
application of Employment Security Act so 
long as Board's decision is reasonable and 
rational, i.e., findings of fact support 
Board's conclusion. U.C.A.1953, 3S-4-1 et 
seq. 
2. Master and Servant «=>1 
In determining whether an employ-
ment relationship exists, court looks behind 
agreement to actual status between par-
ties. 
WOODWARD v 
Cite as, Utah, 
Marvin L. WOODWARD, Plaintiff, 
Appellant and Cross-Respondent, 
v. 
Mildred L. WOODWARD, Defendant, 
Respondent and Cross-Appellant. 
No. 18089. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 4, 1982. 
The First District Court, Box Elder 
County, VeNoy Christoffersen, J., granted 
divorce with property division, and husband 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Durham, J., 
held that: (1) trial court properly awarded 
wife share in that portion of husband's 
retirement benefits to which rights accrued 
during marriage, notwithstanding that hus-
band was not entitled to such benefits until 
he worked additional 15 years, and (2) 
award of such benefits was properly made 
in form of deferred distribution based upon 
fixed percentage. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded. 
1. Divorce <s=»252.3(4) 
Concept of "vesting" of retirement and 
pension rights is inappropriate basis for de-
termining what property should be subject 
to equitable division in divorce proceeding. 
2. Divorce <s^252.3(l, 4) 
In fashioning equitable property divi-
sion in divorce proceeding, court may take 
into consideration all pertinent circumstanc-
es, encompassing all assets of every nature 
possessed by parties, whenever obtained 
and from whatever source derived, and in-
cluding retirement and pension rights; 
overruling Bennett v. Bennett, 607 P.2d 
839. 
3. Divorce <s=> 252.3(1) 
Whether resource is subject to distribu-
tion in divorce proceeding does not turn on 
whether spouse can presently use or control 
it, or on whether resource can be given 
present dollar value; essential criterion is 
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whether right to benefit or asset has ac-
crued in whole or in part during marriage, 
and, to extent that right has so accrued, it 
is subject to equitable distribution. 
4. Divorce <&=> 252.3(4) 
In divorce proceeding, trial court prop-
erly awarded wife one-half share in that 
portion of husband's government retire-
ment benefits to which rights accrued dur-
ing marriage, notwithstanding that hus-
band was not entitled to any such benefits 
until and unless he worked additional 15 
years at government job. 
5. Divorce <s=>252.3(4) 
Where husband's right to retirement 
benefits was contingent upon his working 
an additional 15 years, trial court properly 
awarded wife share in such benefits in form 
of deferred distribution based upon fixed 
percentage. 
Brian R. Florence, Ogden, for plaintiff, 
appellant and cross-respondent. 
Ben H. Hadfield, Brigham City, for de-
fendant, respondent and cross-appellant. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
The plaintiff husband appeals from that 
portion of the trial court's decree of divorce 
which awarded to the defendant wife a 
portion of his retirement benefits. The 
husband argues that the court erred in con-
sidering, as a marital asset, that portion of 
his pension which would be contributed by 
the government at some future date. 
The husband has worked as a civilian 
employee at Hill Air Force Base for fifteen 
years. Under his government pension plan, 
he has contributed $17,500 to the pension 
fund during that time. If he were to leave 
his job now, he would receive only the 
amount of his contributions. In order to 
receive maximum benefits from the plau> 
the husband would have to participate in it 
for a total of 30 years. At that time, the 
government would match the amount of his 
contributions and the husband could elect to 
receive the benefits as an annuity or as a 
lump sum. In its Findings of Fact, the trial 
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court stated that, because one-half of the 
30-year period occurred during the mar-
riage and because the wife is entitled to 
one-half of the amount accrued during that 
time, the wife was therefore "granted an 
equity interest of one-fourth of all proceeds 
which the [husband] receives on his retire-
ment account, to be paid to [the wife] . . . 
as [the husband] receives the proceeds." 
The husband concedes that the wife is enti-
tled to one-half of the sum he has contribut-
ed during the fifteen years of their mar-
riage. However, he claims that she has no 
right or interest in the amount to be con-
tributed by the government at the time of 
his retirement because that amount is con-
tingent upon his continued government em-
ployment. 
[1,2] The only authority cited by the 
husband for his position is Bennett v. Ben-
nett, Utah, 607 P.2d 839 (1980). In that 
case, this Court reversed a trial court's divi-
sion of the husband's retirement benefits 
because the government's future contribu-
tion to the retirement fund was found to 
have "no present value." Id. at 840. How-
ever, in Dogu v. Dogu, Utah, 652 P.2d 1308 
(1982), we commented that "that holding 
reflected a failure of proof." Id. The wife 
urges the adoption of the position taken by 
the California Supreme Court in In re Mar-
riage of Brown, 15 Cal.3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 
126 Cal.Rptr. 633 (1976). There the court 
held that "[p]ension rights, whether or not 
vested, represent a property interest; to 
the extent that such rights derive from 
employment during coverture, they com-
prise a community asset subject to division 
in a dissolution proceeding." Id. at 562-63, 
126 Cal.Rptr. at 634-35. This case over-
ruled an earlier California case of long-
standing which had distinguished pension 
rights on the basis of whether the rights 
had vested. In the context of Utah law, we 
find it unnecessary to consider whether or 
1. In Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 
(1975), the court commented that "the concept 
of vesting should probably find no significant 
place in the developing law of equitable distri-
bution." Id at 348, 331 A.2d at 262. The court 
refers briefly to the origins of the vested inter-
est as it was associated with the concept of 
not the pension rights are "vested or non-
vested." l In Englert v. Englert, Utah, 576 
P.2d 1274 (1978), we emphasized the equita-
ble nature of proceedings dealing with the 
family, pointing out that the court may 
take into consideration all of the pertinent 
circumstances. These circumstances en-
compass "all of the assets of every nature 
possessed by the parties, whenever obtained 
and from whatever source derived; and 
that this includes any such pension fund or 
insurance." Id. at 1276. To the extent that 
Bennett v. Bennett, supra, may limit the 
ability of the court to consider all of the 
parties' assets and circumstances, including 
retirement and pension rights, it is express-
ly overruled. 
[3] In the instant case, the husband ar-
gues that because he cannot now benefit 
from the government's promised contribu-
tions to his pension at the time of retire-
ment, the wife should not receive any por-
tion of the benefits which are based on the 
government's participation. This argument 
fails to recognize that pension or retirement 
benefits are a form of deferred compensa-
tion by the employer. If the rights to those 
benefits are acquired during the marriage, 
then the court must at least consider those 
benefits in making an equitable distribution 
of the marital assets. " 'The right to re-
ceive monies in the future is unquestionably 
. . . an economic resource' subject to equita-
ble distribution based upon proper computa-
tion of its present dollar value." Kikkert v. 
Kikkert, 177 N.J.Super. 471, 475, 427 A.2d 
76, 78 (1981) (emphasis and omission in orig-
inal) (quoting Kruger v. Kruger, 73 N.J. 
464, 468, 375 A.2d 659, 662 (1977)), aff'd, 88 
N.J. 4, 438 A.2d 317 (1981). Whether that 
resource is subject to distribution does not 
turn on whether the spouse can presently 
use or control it, or on whether the resource 
can be given a present dollar value. The 
essential criterion is whether a right to the 
seisin and also to its use in connection with 
"vested rights" in discussions of Constitutional 
guaranties. We agree that this concept of 
"vesting" is an inappropriate basis for deter-
mining what property should be subject to eq-
uitable division in a divorce proceeding. 
WOODWARD v 
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benefit or asset has accrued in whole or in 
part during the marriage. To the extent 
that the right has so accrued it is subject to 
equitable distribution. 
[4] In the instant case, the husband 
must work for another fifteen years to 
qualify for the maximum benefits under 
the pension plan. He will not qualify in the 
twenty-ninth year or in the next to the last 
month. Because he must work for a total 
of thirty years, his pension benefits, includ-
ing any contribution by the government, 
are as dependent on the first fifteen years 
as the last fifteen. Thus, the wife is enti-
tled to share in that portion of the benefits 
to which the rights accrued during the mar-
riage. We hold that the trial court did not 
err in making equitable distribution of the 
husband's retirement benefits. 
[5] We also hold that the method used 
to distribute the retirement benefits was a 
proper exercise of the court's discretion. 
We agree with the discussion in Kikkert, 
supra, where it was stated: 
Long-term and deferred sharing of finan-
cial interests are obviously too susceptible 
to continued strife and hostility, circum-
stances which our courts traditionally 
strive to avoid to the greatest extent 
possible. This goal may be best accom-
plished, if a present value of the pension 
plan is ascertainable, by fixing the other 
spouse's share thereof, as adjusted for all 
appropriate considerations, including the 
length of time the pensioner must survive 
to enjoy its benefits, to be satisfied out of 
other assets leaving all pension benefits 
to the employee himself. 
On the other hand, where other assets 
for equitable distribution are inadequate 
or lacking altogether, or where no 
present value can be established and the 
parties are unable to reach agreement, 
resort must be had to a form of deferred 
distribution based upon fixed percent-
ages. 
Id. at 478, 427 A.2d at 79-80. The facts in 
the present case present just such a circum-
stance: other assets available for equitable 
distribution are inadequate, and a present 
value of retirement benefits would be diffi-
. WOODWARD Utah 433 
656P.2d431 
cult if not impossible to ascertain because 
the value of the benefits is contingent on 
the husband's decision to remain working 
for the government. In such a case, "the 
trial court could use a method widely em-
ployed in other states, whereby the trial 
court determines what percentage of the 
marital property each spouse is to receive, 
and then divides payments from the pension 
plan accordingly." Selchert v. Selchert, 90 
Wis.2d 1, 10, 280 N.W.2d 293, 298 (1979). 
The Wisconsin court continued: 
Under this approach it is unnecessary to 
make any determination as to the value 
of the pension fund. . . . When the bene-
ficiary spouse then opts to receive pay-
ments under the pension plan, the non-
covered spouse would be entitled to her 
established percentage of those pay-
ments. . . . Any risk associated with the 
fund . . . would be by this method appor-
tioned equally between the parties. This 
method may [sic] particularly appropriate 
where the present value of a pension 
fund is very difficult or impossible to 
assess. 
Id. at 10-12, 280 N.W.2d at 298 (footnotes 
omitted). 
The trial court awarded one-half of the 
marital property to each of the parties in 
the instant case. It is clear that the court 
intended the wife to receive one-half of the 
retirement benefits which had accrued dur-
ing the fifteen-year marriage. However, in 
its order, the court specified that the wife 
receive one-fourth of the proceeds of the 
retirement plan as they are received by the 
husband. This portion, one-fourth, awards 
to the wife one-half of the benefits accrued 
during the marriage only if the husband 
works for the full thirty years. The order 
should be modified to provide for the wife 
to receive one-half of the benefits accrued 
during the marriage, regardless of the 
length of time the husband continues in the 
same employment. Whenever the husband 
chooses to terminate his government em-
ployment, the marital property subject to 
distribution is a portion of the retirement 
benefits represented by the number of 
years of the marriage divided by the num-
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ber of years of the husband's employment. 
The wife is entitled to one-half of that 
portion pursuant to the award of the trial 
judge in this case, which our modification is 
intended to sustain. 
We therefore affirm in part, reverse in 
part and remand to the trial court so that 
the order may be amended to conform with 
this opinion. No costs or fees are awarded. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, OAKS and 
HOWE, JJ., concur. 
O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM^ 
Kristine H. BOWEN and Cynthia Bowen, 
an infant by Nathaniel Bowen, her 
guardian ad litem, Plaintiffs and Appel-
lants, 
v. 
RIVERTON CITY, a municipal corpora-
tion, Sterling R. Draper and Enoch 
Smith Sons Company, Defendants and 
Respondents. 
No. 17732. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 4, 1982. 
In a personal injury action, the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, James S. 
Sawaya, J., granted summary judgment for 
city and subsequently, pursuant to motions 
and stipulations in consolidated actions, dis-
missed all claims, counterclaims and cross 
claims with prejudice except for claim 
against city, and plaintiffs appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) 
appeal was timely filed, and (2) whether 
city fulfilled its duty to maintain city 
streets in safe condition was question of 
fact for jury, precluding summary judg-
ment. 
Reversed and remanded for trial. 
1. Appeal and Error <s=>430(l) 
Since failure to file timely notice of 
appeal is jurisdictional, Supreme Court 
lacks jurisdiction to hear appeal if notice 
was not timely filed. Rules Civ.Proc., Rules 
42(a), 73(a). 
2. Appeal and Error <s=>344, 428(2) 
Trial court's April 13 order, entered 
pursuant to stipulation of counsel in both 
consolidated actions, was final judgment in 
each case for purpose of calculating timeli-
ness of appeal, and thus plaintiffs, who on 
May 12, 1981, filed notice of appeal, timely 
filed appeal from trial court's grant of sum-
mary judment on January 26 for city. 
3. Judgment <@=>181(2, 3) 
Summary judgment is proper only if 
pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admis-
sions show that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and that moving party is enti-
tled to judgment as matter of law. 
4. Judgment <s=> 185(2) 
If there is any doubt or uncertainty 
concerning questions of fact, doubt should 
be resolved in favor of opposing party on 
motion for summary judgment and thus 
court must evaluate all evidence and all 
reasonable inferences fairly drawn from ev-
idence in light most favorable to party op-
posing summary judgment. 
5. Judgment <§=^ 180 
Summary judgment is appropriate only 
in the most clear-cut negligence cases. 
6. Municipal Corporations <3=> 757(1) 
City has nondelegable duty to exercise 
due care in maintaining streets within its 
corporate boundaries in reasonably safe 
condition for travel and may be held liable 
for injuries proximately resulting from its 
failure to do so. 
7. Municipal Corporations @=>798 
In fulfilling its nondelegable duty to 
maintain streets, it is necessary for cities to 
maintain traffic signals in reasonably safe, 
visible and working condition. 
